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Abstract
The evolution of honesty norms in a society is studied. Our approach is based on the hy-
pothesis that hiring or firing strategies chosen by firms may affect honesty: if it becomes
common knowledge in the society that being honest is better for workers than cheating
employers, then the share of opportunists gradually go down. It is shown that different
hiring strategies are rational under different honesty standards. If honesty is not a pre-
vailing social norm and volumes of appropriated rent may by high enough, then firms are
better off to stimulate honest behavior by increasing wages. For a relatively honest soci-
ety, firing cheaters is the best strategy. If honesty standards are intermediate or citizens
are too impatient, ignorance of cheating may be rational. Therefore one observes three
possible patterns of honesty evolution: honesty norms may either descend to critically low
level or stabilize at some point or rise and fall cyclically.
We prove that honesty standard rises as losses from dishonest behavior or hiring cost
increase, honesty standard falls as rent appropriation opportunities expand or citizens get
more impatient, and high expectations of economic growth promote honesty.
1 Introduction
It is shown by many studies in the last two decades that in order to explain differences
in per-capita GDP growth over countries, one should take into account political and
civic culture. Indicators used in empirical papers (Aaron (2000), Popov (2000)), such as
indices of corruption, rule of law, property rights, are not fully determined by the judicial
system, civil or criminal law or other formal institutions, they also depend substantially
on behaviorial norms prevailed in the society (North, 1993). Interpersonal trust, norms of
cooperative behavior and associations within groups are often referred to as social capital.
There are a number of empirical and theoretical works showing that social capital and
other cultural factors, such as corruption, observing the law, degree of paternalism, matter
for economic performance, the choice of economic policy and the strategy of institutional
development (Putnam et al (1993), Putnam (2001), Knack and Keefer (1997), Barro
(1996), Shirley (2005)).
It is usually accepted that the features of civic culture grow out of centuries-old devel-
opment of nations and states. Nevertheless, a number of important economic parameters,
such as interpersonal trust or the level of corruption, can substantially change within
twenty or thirty years (Conradt (1989), Radaev (1998), see also Polterovich (2001)). This
means that studying growth, one should not consider the cultural indicators as completely
exogenous parameters, as it is assumed by standard theories of economic growth. A de-
scription of mechanisms of cultural changes should be included in the model of long-term
development.
The development of the formal theory of such mechanisms is just beginning. The
evolutionary approach to different behaviorial norms was suggested by Bichierri and Rov-
elli (1996) (evolution of corruption behavior), Nyborg and Rege (2003) (evolution of con-
siderate smoking behavior), Azar (2004) (evolution of tipping). The impact of cultural
factors on the transformational recession is studied in papers by Hillman and Ursprung
(1998), where a theoretical model is set up, and Polterovich (2000), where the report on
the empirical data, basically, concerning Russia is given. There are a number of studies on
trust (Rose-Ackerman (2001), Kornai et al (2003, 2004), Raiser et al (2003), Bohnet and
Croson (2004)), which is closely related to honesty. Economic and institutional determi-
nants of trust are studied by Zak and Knack (2001). The signaling role of social culture
in fixing market failures is shown by Fang (2001). However, the interdependence between
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cultural parameters and economic institutions is not enough studied.
In the present paper, the attempt is made to advance in this direction. We base our
investigation on the hypothesis that this interdependence is bilateral: the culture affects
the institutional structure, which in turn determine the evolution of a number of cultural
indicators. We demonstrate this idea by studying the evolution of honesty norms in the
society and hiring strategies of firms.
An economy, where all people are dishonest, is inefficient, because the implementation
of contracts requires high transaction costs. At the same time, there is no reason to be
honest in a totally dishonest society, so this is a stable inefficient equilibrium (institu-
tional trap). It was noted in some papers (see, for example, Knott and Miller (1987),
Polterovich (2005)) that the development of a civil society providing coordination of the
economic agents is necessary for getting out of the trap. Acceleration of economic growth
is another factor that can help the society get out of institutional traps, because an in-
crease in returns to productive activity makes the latter more attractive than rent-seeking
(Polterovich (2005), Balatsky (2002)).
The evolution of honest or dishonest behavior and formation of individual and col-
lective reputations is studied by Tirole (1993). He sets up a model in which there are
three types of agents: honest (never cheat), dishonest (always cheat) and opportunistic
(cheat or do not cheat depending on what is better off). The principal can learn about
dishonest behavior of an agent in the past with some probability and decrease his income
by offering him less efficient task which is less sensitive to cheating. So, opportunists may
have incentive to behave honestly in order to maintain their good reputation. Collective
reputations of people communities (e. g., firms) are formed on the basis of individual
reputations.
The setting in the present paper is quite similar: honesty in the society may be thought
of as its collective reputation. However, there is an important difference: the Tirole model
studies the evolution of behavior driven by the reputational mechanism. The behaviorial
norms of the society (proportion of honest, dishonest and opportunistic agents) are ex-
ogenous and remain unchanged. As distinct from the Tirole framework, we rather study
the evolution of behaviorial norms through the process of establishing (or degrading) the
civic culture which is much slower than the evolution of reputation. It is also worth noting
that we focus on the choice of hiring strategies by firms, whereas in the Tirole setting,
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there can be no analog of the tradeoff between hiring strategies because there is no hiring
cost.
Somanathan and Rubin (2004) suggested the following hypothesis on the evolution of
honesty: if an honest worker gets larger expected income than a dishonest one, then the
share of honest persons in the society rises. This hypothesis represents the evolutionary
mechanism of “interiorization” of successful behavior through family education and learn-
ing. This is similar to behavior norm selection principles in the evolutionary game theory
(see Vasin (2005) for exposition of main ideas and references). Somanathan and Rubin
assume that a dishonest worker is less productive than an honest one (so, his wage will
be lower under perfect competition) but can appropriate rents. An honest worker may be
recognized with some probability; in this case she earns basic wage plus extra payment
The expected incomes of honest and dishonest workers must equate in equilibrium. If
almost all people are honest, then the basic wage rate is close to the marginal product of
a honest person, and dishonest workers earn larger income than honest ones. Therefore,
the proportion of honest people decreases in societies with high honesty standards. It is
shown that the accumulation of capital stock has a positive impact on the evolution of
honesty.
In the present paper we use the Somanathan — Rubin hypothesis. However, we consider
another mechanism, which, probably, essentially affects the evolution of honesty, but is not
investigated so far in that context. This mechanism is based on hiring or firing strategies
chosen by firms. We assume that there is no perfect labor market and unemployment
takes place, so firms enjoy all of bargaining power and can fully control wages and hiring
policy (in Somanathan and Rubin’s framework, entrepreneurs have no possibilities of such
control due to the perfect competition in the labor market). We study optimal strategies of
firms under different honesty standards and the impact of these strategies on the evolution
of honesty. We also study the impact of hiring cost, rent appropriation opportunities and
other parameters on the evolution of honesty
What should the chief of the firm do, when he learns that his employee is dishonest?
At first sight, the most natural reaction is to dismiss the worker. However, in societies
with low standards of honesty, doing so is not typical. It is irrational to dismiss a skilled
worker, if with a high probability a newly employed worker will be dishonest too. Such
strategy retains the standards of honesty unchanged. However, it can be more profitable
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for a firm to increase the wage of the worker so as to stimulate her behave honestly. If
firms play this strategy, then, it is natural to assume, the share of conformists (those
who follow the norm rather than the benefit), will rise since dishonest behavior turns
out to be unreasonable. Does it mean that opportunists will disappear at all eventually?
Not necessarily. Under high standards of honesty (significant share of conformists), the
stimulating strategy is unprofitable for firms: there is no reason to reward for honesty,
if almost everyone is honest. Dishonest workers will be dismissed, however their welfare
may turn out to be higher than that of an honest worker. Hence, the standards of honesty
will gradually fall. The above reasoning shows that such mechanism may lead to some
intermediate standard of honesty, i. e. an equilibrium share of honest potential workers
(conformists). This share is not necessarily 0 or 1. It depends on a number of parameters of
the system. The equilibrium standard of honesty depends on the provision of the property
rights (the opportunities of a dishonest worker to appropriate profits depend on the level
of property rights protection), on the reputation mechanisms determining the alternative
income of a dismissed worker, on costs of hiring and adaptation of new workers. The
purpose of the present paper is to study the impact of these and some other factors on
the equilibrium standard of honesty and hiring strategies.
It will be shown that one of the following hiring/firing strategies will be chosen by the
firm (which one, depends on the share of honest people in the society):
• stimulating: increase wages to stimulate honest behavior;
• refining: firing cheaters, no extra wages;
• ignoring: no extra wages, no dismissals.
It turns out that the first strategy is rational for low honesty standards, the second
one for high standards and the third one for some intermediate standards. It will be
shown that stabilized long-run behavior of the system may take one of two forms: there
is either a unique stable equilibrium or a stable cycle. It will also be shown that technical
progress, growth expectations, political and economic stability may positively affect the
attractiveness of honesty-stimulating strategy and lead to increasing the share of honest
persons.
5
2 Basic Model
Consider an economy, which consists of a large number of potential workers and a fixed
number of firms which form the “industrial sector”. The model is dynamic, with two levels
of discrete time which we call “fast time” and “slow time”. Allowing for some loss of
strictness, we assume that each period of slow time includes infinitely many periods of
fast time. In fast time, firms and workers produce, earn profits and incomes, make plans
about their behavior (the planning horizon is assumes to be infinite but not spreading
to future periods of slow time). In slow time, the evolution of fundamental societal and
cultural parameters (in particular, honesty standard) take place. This evolution can be
thought of as the process of educating new generations of people, transferring them basic
cultural settings. The evolution is supposed to have some features of Darwin’s natural
selection: those settings survive which lead to higher benefits (it is implied that being
more successful, owners of such settings have more impact on the evolution). Firms and
workers are assumed to be infinitely long living. The intertemporal preferences of firms
and workers are represented by discount factors, respectively, R = 1
1+r
and Γ = 1
1+γ
(r, γ > 0).
The pool of all workplaces in the industrial sector is modelled by [0, 1] interval of real
numbers. The number of potential workers is much larger that the number of workplaces,
so the pool of all potential workers is modelled by [0,∞) interval1. It is supposed that
those who are out of the industrial sector are occupied in other sectors of the economy
or are unemployed. Without loss of generality, let us assume that their income is equal
to zero2. We assume also that firms in the industrial sector cannot pay wages lower than
some minimal level w0 (w0 ≥ 0; this threshold level may occur because of sunk costs of
training or adaptation or formal restrictions).
Each worker can yield the firm y units of value added and the firm pays him
wage w ≥ w0. However, some information asymmetry is inevitable in the production pro-
cess, so dishonest workers can cheat the employer and appropriate some part of his profit.
1Although this setting seems to describe an economy at a rather early stage of industrialization, it
allows for more general interpretation, if we take the key assumption that the honesty norms in the society
are strongly affected by the “rules of the game” among people with relatively high income.
2Thus, the incomes of workers in the industrial sector introduced below should be thought of as excess
earnings comparing to the reservation income rather than as absolute values.
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We assume that there are two types of workers: honest workers and opportunists. An hon-
est worker never appropriates the rent, so his income is w, whereas the profit of the firm is
pi = y−w. An opportunist may choose the honest strategy too (if it looks profitable), but
alternatively he can appropriate rent s (s > 0), so his income is w + s. In this case, rent
dissipation takes place (the process of appropriation takes some additional resources), so
the profit of the firm is y−w− b, where b ≥ s and b− s is the dissipated part of the rent.
Among potential workers, there is a share q ∈ [0, 1] of unconditionally honest ones
(conformists) and 1−q of opportunists. Here q may be considered as a measure of honesty
norms in the society. This parameter may evolve over time (see below).
A worker can leave the firm in the following cases:
• Spontaneous leaving (retirement etc): the worker leaves the industrial sector forever.
A randomly taken worker from outside is invited instead. The probability of this
event is ε.
• The worker is fired for cheating (in accordance with the owner’s strategy). In this
case, he has to leave the industrial sector forever and a randomly taken worker from
outside is hired instead. Thus, we assume that the society has a perfect reputation
mechanism, so that any cheater becomes bad-reputed and cannot find another job
in the industrial sector.
Employers may have many ways to control cheating from worker’s side. In this paper,
we assume that they exercise the control through hiring strategies. The hiring strategy is
a rule assigning to each possible pre-history of observed cheating the corresponding wage
w ≥ w0 or w = 0, which is treated as firing. Each firm declares its strategy and randomly
chooses candidates for each workplace3. The type of a worker is unknown for the employer
at the moment of hiring; only after one period may the employer observe worker’s type
(for example, if the worker cheats). Each time that a new worker is employed, the firm
incurs sunk cost h > 0 (training expenditures, lack of experience etc). Hiring cost h is
3The labor market in the model is assumed imperfect in the following sense: workers are not free to
choose the firm they are hired to, this decision is made by employers. This is so because there are infinitely
many potential workers per workplace, so there is tough competition among workers for workplaces in
the industrial sector.
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also associated with the amount of human capital needed for production, i. e. with the
level of technology and knowledge-intensity of production.
Let us consider the following basic hiring strategies:
• Strategy I (stimulating): the employer fires cheaters and offers wage w = w∗,
which is so high that there is no reason for a worker to cheat. This strategy leads
to honest behavior of all workers, even if they are opportunists. Life-time contracts
practiced in Japan may be considered as a prototype of this strategy.
• Strategy II (refining): the employer fires cheaters and offers minimal wage w =
w0. As a result, cheaters are revealed and fired after one period of work. Thereby,
the firm achieves high percentage of honest workers (refines its staff) but more often
has to hire new people and incur the hiring cost.
• Strategy III (ignoring): the employer does not fire cheaters and pays minimal
wage w = w0. Perhaps, this kind of strategy was practiced by employers in USSR
(stealing from the workplace was almost never punished).
One of these hiring strategies is implemented as far as some workplace gets vacant in
the end of some period. A new worker is hired by the beginning of the next period (we
assume that the moment of hiring relates to the current period, so the hiring cost h is not
discounted for the employer). There are reasons to believe that other hiring strategies are
“worse” than these three. At least, it will be shown that one of these strategies is an optimal
response on others’ using these strategies. Note also that it makes sense to distinguish
among these strategies only if minimal wage w0 is not honesty-stimulating (w∗ > w0).
Otherwise, strategies I and II actually lead to the same outcome, with wage w0 offered
and no one cheating (strategy III is never played in this case, because it is definitely
better off to stimulate the honest behavior “for free” than not stimulate). This “happy”
case is not very interesting and will not be considered here.
It is assumed that each firm choose an optimal strategy each period4. It could be
possible that different firms play different strategies (profits of all firms would be equal
then) but it will be shown that only for some special values of q will this be possible.
4The optimal choice of each firm does not depend on the others’ behavior in this simple setting.
Generally, the concept of Nash equilibrium should be used.
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Now let us describe the evolution of societal parameter q. The game presented above
is considered in “quick time” (in the medium-run perspective). The parameter of honesty
is considered constant in this perspective. However, in the “slow time” (in the long-run
perspective, out of workers’ and firms’ planning horizon) ϕ can evolve. We follow the
approach suggested by Somanathan and Rubin (2004) in modelling the long-run evolution
of q: if honest behavior is better off for a worker than dishonest one, then q slowly rises;
in the opposite case, q falls. Note that in our setting, the share of honest people will rise,
if the stimulating strategy is played by all firms5 and fall, if it is played by no firm.
Thereby, the basic model is described. The next section presents some analysis of the
model.
3 Characterization of Equilibria
Firstly, note that only the three strategies numbered above can be rational ones. Indeed,
it could be rational to pay wages higher than w0 only to stimulate workers to behave
honestly. The way of stimulation implemented by strategy I requires the lowest possible
wage (if, for example, the firm promised to lower the cheater’s wage to w0 rather than
dismiss him, a higher wage would be needed to stimulate the honest behavior). If strategy I
is not rational, then either w = w0 or w = 0. If it is better off to dismiss a worker, then
doing this immediately is the best decision.
Firms’ choice of hiring strategies is based on comparing the present discounted values
of expected future profits for each strategy (respectively, V I , V II , V III ). Values V I and
V III are given by
(1−R)V I = piε − δ, (1)
(1−R)V III = piε − (1− q)b, (2)
where piε = pi0 − εh and δ = w∗ − w0 is the extra wage needed to stimulate the honest
behavior (it is assumed that δ > 0).
5Strictly speaking, under the minimal honesty-stimulating wage, an honest opportunist will earn just
the same income as a cheater. However, it is natural to assume that, other things being equal, the honest
behavior is more pleasant, even for an opportunist.
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The value of V II is not constant and depends on the period of continuous using of
the refining strategy (let τ denote the duration of this period). Indeed, suppose that the
firm has never played the refining strategy and has decided to switch to it at moment
τ = 0. Just after the switching, the firm has share q of honest workers. As τ increases,
dishonest workers are being filtered out and other workers are hired instead (not all of
them dishonest) and the present discounted value of expected future profits V IIτ gradually
grows. The evolution of V IIτ is given by the following Bellman recursive formula:
V IIτ = ψτpiε + (1− ψτ )(piε − b))− (1− ε)(1− ψτ )h+RV IIτ+1, (3)
where ψτ is the share of honest workers at the firm, which is determined by
ψτ+1 = ψτ − ε(ψτ − q) + q(1− ε)(1− ψτ ), ψ0 = q (4)
(note that ε(ψτ − q) honest people are dissipated (substituted with dishonest ones) and
q(1 − ε)(1 − ψτ ) honest people are hired instead of dismissed cheaters). The system of
difference equations (3)–(4) can be easily solved6. We obtain the following explicit formulas
for ψτ and V IIτ :
ψτ =
1−
(
(1− ε)(1− q)
)τ+1
ε+ q − εq q, (5)
(1−R)V IIτ = piε −
(1− q)B
ε+ q − εq
(
ε+
(1− ε)qr
r + ε+ q − εq
(
(1− ε)(1− q)
)τ)
, (6)
where B = b+ (1− ε)h. In particular, for τ = 0 we have
(1−R)V II0 = piε −
(1− q)(ε+ r)B
r + ε+ q − εq . (7)
In the stabilized regime, we have
ψ∞ =
q
ε+ q − εq , (8)
(1−R)V II∞ = piε −
(1− q)εB
ε+ q − εq . (9)
Now we are ready to derive conditions for medium-run equilibria (not taking into
account the evolution of honesty. Let us consider the following cases:
6It might seem that one edge condition is missing. However, the requirement of a finite limit of V IIτ
as τ →∞ is actually such a condition.
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All firms play the stimulating strategy: this is an equilibrium, if q < min(q12, q13),
where
q12 =
B − δ
B + δ (1−ε)
r+ε
, (10)
q13 = 1− δ
b
, (11)
where δ = w∗ − w0 is the extra wage under strategy I, w∗ = γ˜s is the minimal honesty-
stimulating wage and γ˜ = ε+γ
1−ε is the worker’s discount parameter modified by the possi-
bility of retirement.
All firms play the refining strategy: this is an equilibrium, if q > max(q21, q23),
where
q21 =
B − δ
B + δ (1−ε)
ε
(q21 < q12), (12)
q23 =
εh
b
. (13)
All firms play the ignoring strategy: this is an equilibrium, if q13 < q < q32, where
q32 =
(ε+ r)h
b
(q32 > q23). (14)
The above considerations suggest that the stimulating strategy is played for low q, the
refining strategy for high q and the ignoring strategy for medium q (or for low q, if the
benefits of the stimulating strategy are low, see case 1 below).
Now let us study the long-run evolution of honesty parameter q. Remember that
according to our assumption, q rises when the stimulating strategy is played by all firms
and falls when it is played by no firms. The following cases are then possible:
Case 1: δ > b. The stimulating strategy is never played; the standard of honesty
eventually falls to the minimal possible level (zero). At the early stage of this honesty
collapse (when q > q23), firms try to fight cheating by using the refining strategy; at the
next stage, they ignore cheating (strategy III).
Case 2: b−εh < δ < b. If the system starts from low q (q < q13), then the stimulating
strategy is played and the standard of honesty rises until it reaches the level q13. After
that, q stays at q = q13, because after a small increase the ignoring strategy is played
11
and q falls and after a small decrease the stimulating strategy is played and q rises. If
the system starts from high q (q > q32), then the refining strategy is played and q falls
till the level q23. Then firms switch to the ignoring strategy and q falls again down to the
equilibrium level q13. Thus, there is a unique stable equilibrium in the long run, q = q13.
Case 3: b − (ε + r)h < δ < b − εh. As in the previous case, the system eventually
gets to the unique stable long-run equilibrium q = q13 but the transitional dynamics is
slightly different: if the system starts from high q, then the refining strategy is played
until q falls down to q21. Then firms switch to the stimulating strategy and q rises up to
the equilibrium level.
Case 4: δ < b−(ε+r)h. As before, if the system starts from low q, then the stimulating
strategy is played until q rises up to q12. Then firms switch to the refining strategy and
q falls down to q21. Then firms switch to the stimulating strategy and so on: the system
gets into a stable cycle between q21 and q127.
The graphs of intertemporal profit functions V I , V II0 , V II∞ , V III for cases 2,3 and 4 are
depicted in Figure 1.
4 Comparative Statics
In the previous section, the typical cases of long-run behavior of honesty standard q
were characterized. We have seen that in long-run equilibrium, honesty standard q is
either equal to zero or q13 or oscillates between q21 and q12. Now we can study how the
equilibrium honesty standards depend on the parameters of the model.
1. Honesty standard rises as hiring cost increase. Since hiring cost h is associat-
ed with accumulating human capital, this result may be interpreted in the following way:
the more human capital needed for production, the higher the attractiveness of honesty-
stimulating strategy, which does not requires hiring so much new workers as the refining
strategy. Although, if the refining strategy is not used in equilibrium (q = q13), then the
hiring cost does not matter.
7The cycle occurs because of our assumption about “slow” changes of honesty standards. If the speed
of adjustment of honesty standards were not much slower than the speed of filtering the staff (in case of
strategy II), then it would be likely that the amplitude of the cycle be small. As the extreme case, there
would be no cycle and the equilibrium intertemporal profit would be V IIτ , with 0 < τ <∞.
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Case 2
Case 3
Case 4
Figure 1: Intertemporal profit of firms (cases 2,3,4).
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2. Honesty standard rises as losses from dishonest behavior increase. Losses
from dishonest behavior b are associated with technical progress: as noted before, the
adverse effect of cheating is likely to be higher for more advanced technologies. Honesty-
stimulating strategy I gets more attractive than strategies II and III which lead to
cheating by opportunists. So, the model shows that technical progress promotes honesty.
Note that Somanathan and Rubin (2004) obtained a similar result: an increase in capital
per worker (which is closely related to technical progress) positively affects honesty.
3. Honesty standard rises as rent appropriation opportunities shrink. If
s decreases (because of institutional development), then the honesty-stimulating wage
gets lower and the stimulating strategy more attractive. As s decreases, the losses from
dishonest behavior decrease too, so the refining strategy also gets more attractive. However
the former effect is stronger than the latter. This is also close to one of the results by
Somanathan and Rubin (2004): the inefficiency and corruptibility of the government can
adversely influence the accumulation of honesty.
4. Honesty standard rises as citizens get less impatient. As γ decreases, the
honesty-stimulating wage gets lower and the stimulating strategy more attractive. So,
political and economic stability promotes honesty. The extent of impatience is also a
matter of social culture, so the result may also be interpreted as the interdependence
between the two cultural characteristics (impatience and honesty).
5. Growth expectations promote honesty. If proportional growth of incomes and
profits at rate g is expected, this equivalent to decreasing the discount factors R and Γ
down to (1 + g)R and (1 + g)Γ, respectively. Extra wage δ stimulating honest behavior
negatively depends on g while V II∞ and V III do not depend on g, so q13 and q21 are
increasing in g. V II0 is increasing in g too, so the total effect on q12 is ambiguous.
5 Endogenous probability of detection and dishonesty
trap
In the basic model, this probability of detecting the cheater was assumed to be 1. Suppose
now that it is equal to p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1). Then the critical (for our analysis) levels of honesty
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standard are given by
q13 = 1− δ
b
, (15)
q12 =
B − δ
B + δp (1−ε)
r+ε
, (16)
q21 =
B − δ
B + δp (1−ε)
ε
, (17)
where δ = s
p/γ−1+p − w0 and B = b + (1− ε)ph (provided that p(q) > γ1+γ ; otherwise, no
wage is honesty-stimulating). It is easy to see that δ is decreasing in p, so if q = q13 in
equilibrium (case 2 or 3 on page 11)8, then the equilibrium honesty standard positively
depends on p. If the long-run evolution of honesty forms the cycle between q21 and q12,
then the effect seems to be ambiguous because an increase in the probability of detection
positively affects not only the attractiveness of strategy I but also that of strategy II.
However, it can be shown that the eventual honesty standard positively depends on p in
this case too.
In the setting described above, the probability of detection is exogenous and constant.
However, there are reasons to believe that it actually depends on the percentage of hon-
est persons in the society. Indeed, if cheating is imperfectly observed, some additional
investigation for each case of possible cheating may be needed. The total cost of all such
investigation is low, if honesty is a social norm, and is high, the share of dishonest persons
is large. Here we are not going to model this issue in detail (it is rather standard), we just
want to note that it is typical that p positively depends on q. The dynamical structure of
the long-run behavior of the honesty standard may differ substantially from the case of
exogenous p. In particular, multiple long-run equilibria may occur.
To show this, let us consider either of equations (15–17) determining the long-run
steady-state equilibrium or the equilibrium cycle. Now each of these equations allow for
multiple solutions. Additionally, a “bad” long-run asymptotically stable equilibrium with
q = 0 may occur, if using strategy I is irrational under low honesty standards. Since, as
it can be easily checked, strategy III is better than strategy II at this level, the totally
dishonest equilibrium does exist, if p = p(0) is lower than some critical level pc:
p(0) < pc =
γ
1 + γ
(
1 +
s
w0 + b
)
. (18)
8The relationships between the parameters of the model determining cases 1–4 for any p are the same
as for p = 1.
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At the same time, if p(q) is sufficiently high for high q, then a long-run equilibrium
with positive q must exist, so there are two stable equilibria, with high and low (actually
zero) level of honesty.
Let us consider for example a linear dependence between p and q: p(q) = p0(1−q)+p1q.
Suppose that there is no cycles in long-run equilibria. This is guaranteed by the following
condition:
p1 <
γ
1 + γ
(
1 +
s
w0 + b− (r + )h
)
(19)
(if the hiring cost h is sufficiently high, (19) holds).
As follows from (18), the zero equilibrium exists, if
p0 < pc. (20)
The (unique stable) positive equilibrium exists, if(
2 + w0
b
)
p0 −
(
1 + w0
b
)
p1 <
γ
1+γ
;
w0
b
p0 −
(
1− w0
b
)
p1 >
γ
1+γ
;
4γ(1 + γ)(p1 − p0)bs < ((bp1 + w0(p1 − p0))(1 + γ)− γb)2 .
(21)
Thus, if conditions (19-21) hold (generally, they are consistent), then there are two long-
run equilibria with different levels of honesty. In particular, if the total losses from cheating
are relatively low (b < w0/2), then the following condition is sufficient for the multiplicity
of equilibria:
p1 − p0 > γ
1 + γ
, (22)
i. e. if the graph of dependence p(q) is sufficiently steep, then there are multiple equilibria.
The situation described above gives us the trap of dishonesty which is a special case
of institutional trap (see Polterovich, 1999). Once having got to the attraction area of the
bad equilibrium, the system converges to this equilibrium and cannot leave it by itself.
6 Conclusion
The model considered above shows that not only social culture affects economic devel-
opment but there is also the reverse causality. In particular, a positive change may be
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inspired by the class of entrepreneurs who are interested in honesty of their employees. It
was shown that stimulating honesty is rational for low honesty standards, firing cheaters
without stimulation for high standards and ignoring dishonest behavior for intermediate
standards. In the simple basic model, there is either a unique stable long-run equilibrium
or a stable cycle. It was shown that technical progress, growth expectations, political and
economic stability may positively affect the attractiveness of honesty-stimulating strate-
gy and lead to moving up the honesty standards. However, if the probability of detecting
cheaters positively depends on the honesty standard, a trap of dishonesty may occur.
The investigation is not completed yet. There are several ways of further development.
It would be interesting to study how the structure and evolution of information channels
in the society (on which the reputation mechanism is based) affects the evolution of hon-
esty. Another interesting issue is the impact of labor force movement among firms. Among
other directions of further investigation are: wage rate formation under unemployment (in
the current version of the model, wages are totally controlled by the firm which is a sim-
plification), dynamic framework with capital and technical progress, more sophisticated
rules to prevent cheating, the possibility of cheating by managers (some empirical obser-
vations show that there can be high honesty standard among ordinary workers and low
among managers), the role of natural resources. Some ways of empirical verification are
also in plans.
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